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solved the rights of the litigants, but would have succeeded in clearing
up a considerable amount of the confusion which has so long existed in
this area.
SPENCER L. BLAYLOCK, JR.
Contracts-Conditional Acceptances-Variations in
the Construction of the Offeree's Language
There is uniform adherence to the rules that: (1) "To consummate
a valid contract an acceptance must be unequivocal and must not change,
add to or qualify the terms of the offer."' (2) Variations do not change,
add to or qualify the terms of the offer when additional language is
framed in words of request2 or when additional language merely recites
conditions implied in fact or in law from the offer.3 Paradoxically,
however, there seems to be little uniformity in the application of these
rules to individual cases in which the language, although not changing
the terms of the price, or nature of the subject matter of the contract,
does to some extent create contingencies. The following cases, all con-
cerned with transactions for the sale of real estate, with the exception
of one, are illustrative of this problem.
The phrase "subject to" has traditionally been a conditional ex-
pression.4 One court, in construing what it determined to be a con-
ditional acceptance said: "The meaning usually attributed to such
words as 'subject to' is that a promise that is so limited is a condi-
tional promise, one that is different from that for which the offeror
bargained." 5 However, in a recent North Carolina case, the court had
no difficulty in construing the defendant's use of "subject to" as a
phrase which did not affect the validity of an acceptance.0 Defendant
had used the following language in replying to plaintiff's offer. "Your
telegram... is accepted subject to details to be worked out by you and
[my lawyer]."' Defendant contended that his reply did not constitute
an acceptance because the language was conditional. The court decided
that the phrase "subject to details to be worked out . . ." was "an ex-
pression of hope or suggestion." s In the court's discussion may be found
1 Recent Cases, 20 GIN. L. REv. 68, 69 (1952).
2 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS § 79 (rev. ed. 1936).
Id. § 78.
'1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 61 (1950).
'Lawrence Block Co. v. Palston, 123 Cal. App. 2d 300, -, 266 P. 2d 856, 862(1954).
' Carver v. Britt, 241 N. C. 538, 85 S. E. 2d 888 (1955).
'Id. at 539, 85 S. E. 2d at 889.
' Id. at 541, 85 S. E. 2d at 890. The court quoted as follows from 17 C. J. S.,
CONTRACTS at 384: "'If an offer is accepted as made, the acceptance is not con-
ditional and does not vary from the offer because of inquiries whether the offeror
will change his terms, or as to future acts, or by the expression of a hope, or
suggestion as to terms, or by the intimation that a time be fixed for the con-
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an inference to the effect that although the use of "subject to" would
not invalidate the acceptance, if "provided" had been substituted for
"subject to" the contract would never have been formed.0 This dis-
tinction without further inquiry into the facts of the case would cer-
tainly appear to be precious.
In the following two cases the respective courts reached opposing
decisions as to the legal effect of the language in each case, although the
language of both cases seems to convey substantially the same meaning.
Quaere as to which of the following replies is conditional:
"Please send your abstract to me at once, at the address below.
I will have same brought up to date and examined and proceed
to close up the matter with you.' 0
"We would like to have you send on the deed and abstract to the
Iowa State Bank of Waterloo, Iowa, and when they are ex-
amined, and found to be correct, your money will be turned
over to you." 11
The first reply was construed to be an acceptance. In refering
to the matter of forwarding the abstract, the court said:
"It is not such a change as amounted to a qualification of the
original offer. . . . Plaintiff was not bound to accept the con-
veyance if the title proved to be unsatisfactory. This being so,
the matter of furnishing the abstract was merely a detail which
did not change the terms of the contract.' 12
In the second case, the court in rejecting the contention that the
added language was a "collateral or subsequent suggestion or request"
said:
"Unless the so called request or suggestion is a matter clearly
apart from the acceptance, and the intention of the writer to
declare his acceptance of the offer as made without regard to the
matter of his request is apparent, the letter ought to be read as
a whole and words which fairly import a new or additional con-
dition to the terms proposed in the offer should be so construed,
and the acceptance held to be insufficient."' 3
In this case the court was very much influenced by defendant's use of
summation of the transactions, or because the offeror otherwise expresses dissatis-
factions with the offer or adds immaterial words which do not in legal effect
qualify the offer. .2.
Ibid.
10 Bushmeyer v. McGary, 112 Ark. 373, 376, 166 S. W. 168 (1911).
"Knox v. McMurray, 159 Iowa 171, 176, 140 N. W. 652, 653 (1913).
-Bushmeyer v. McGary, 112 Ark. 353, 378, 166 S. W. 168, 169 (1911).
"'Knox v. McMurray, 159 Iowa 171, 184, 140 N. W. 652, 657 (1913).
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the word "when" in his purported acceptance. 14  Certainly the word
"when" was used but what difference should this really make? In the
former case, the fact that the offeree did not intend to proceed with
"closing up the matter" until he had received the abstract, had it brought
up to date and had determined the correctness of the title seems to cre-
ate the same impression of contingency as the literal use of the word
"when."' 5
These inconsistencies in the interpretation of language which goes
to the making of contracts are not confined to cases which arise in
different jurisdictions. A similar comparison may be made of two
cases decided by the North Carolina court. In Hall v. Jones,'8 the
North Carolina court found the following to be conditional: "I accept
your offer .... I will have the deed fixed up within fifteen or twenty
days and mailed to you; then you can sign the deed and send it to the
Deposit and Savings Bank ... with intructions to deliver to me upon
the payment of $1,500.00, or if you prefer, I will come to Bluefield."' 7
Yet, in Ruckers v. Sanders,'8 the court found the acceptance to be
unconditional where the offeree, while not otherwise qualifying his
reply added this language: "Just draw on me here at Greensboro with
your ... stock attached to draft and I will honor same."' 9  In the first
case the court said: "The buyer has no right to attach any conditions,
if he proposes to hold the seller upon the original offer." 20 The court,
in the second case, based its decision upon the theory that a "condition
which goes to the making of the contract" should be distinguished from
"a suggestion relating to the ultimate performance."''  These distinc-
tions, on their face appear to be precious to a degree which certainly
seems fortuitous to anyone faced with the business of preparing to liti-
gate a case concerned with the problem of conditional language in the
acceptance. 2
2
"Id. at 182, 140 N. W. at 676.
' Perhaps the essential problem in both of these cases amounted to determining
whether the acceptor-offeree intended to promise to buy if title was marketable as
distinguished from its being satisfactory (implying greater qualifications than
marketablity) to the purchaser or to someone approving the property for him.
However, neither court seemed to consider this point.
1- 164 N. C. 199, 80 S. E. 228 (1913).
27 Id. at 200, 80 S. E. at 228. The offer to which this language was a reply
read: "I am just in receipt of your letter, inquiring for cash price on the Callo-
way farm. I will take fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500.) cash for it ..
18 182 N. C. 607, 109 S. E. 857 (1921).
21 Id. at 608, 109 S. E. at 857. This reply was in answer to the defendant's
letter stating that he owned 50 shares of stock which he would sell for $10,000.00.0 Hall v. Jones, 164 N. C. 199, 200, 80 S. E. 228, 229 (1913).
'1 Ruckers v. Sanders, 182 N. C. 607, 609, 109 S. E. 857, 858 (1921).
"--The confusion which results from the varied interpretation of similar language
in these cases has not been alleviated by their classification according to the de-
cisions in the cases. Thus, the language of Hall v. Jones is classified as condi-
tional, 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS, § 77, n. 10 (rev. ed. 1936), whereas the language
of Ruckers v. Sanders is classified as conditional language which does not qualify
1956]
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In the way of a guide through the apparent confusion presented by
a comparison of these cases, it is submitted that latent in most of the
cases involving the problem of conditional language of a borderline
nature are elements from which may be inferred a principle of an
equitable nature. Although this can in no way replace the objective
method of interpreting the language of the offer and acceptance as it ap-
pears on its face, it might be helpful in reconciling the apparent incon-
sistencies of the the judicial construction of "acceptance" language in
some of the cases, and it might be helpful in predicting the results
of an untried case.
This principle might be said to derive from the fundamental as-
sumption that the law not only redresses injury, but also conserves the
value of the expectation of gain which constitutes the substructure of
commercial enterprise.23 A comparison of Carver v. Britt24 and James
v. Darby25 yields a fairly clear illustration of this principle.
The Darby case concerned the legal effect of the following language:
"If details are satisfactorily arranged, I have decided to accept....
This language was held to be conditional. Although there are other
differences in the factual situations of these two cases, the substantial
difference which very probably accounts for the different construction
of the language lies in the character of the actions of the parties. In
the Darby case, although the defendant sold the property after he had
received the plaintiff's letter containing the purported acceptance, he
notified the plaintiff of the sale, and in addition explained the reasons
he had decided to sell elsewhere. By his explanation (which was pre-
sented in evidence) the defendant made it clear that he was genuinely
uncertain as to the plaintiff's sincere desire to complete the sale, in
spite of the purported acceptance. In a word, the surrounding evi-
dence made it clear that the defendant did not intend arbitrarily to cut
the plaintiff off from an expected source of gain.
The character of the defendant's action in the Carver case was other-
wise. There the defendant, while the plaintiff was endeavoring to "work
out the details" with the defendant's lawyer, told the plaintiff that he
would "straighten things out with him."'2 7 Yet on the next day the de-
the legal effect of the offer, 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 78 n. 4 (rev. ed. 1936)
without any explanation for the conflict.
3 Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553, 580 (1933) : "Finally,
the recovery that the law allows to the injured promisee is not determined by what
he lost in relying on the promise, but rather what he would have gained if the
promise had been kept. There are obviously many cases where the injured party
is substantially no worse after the breach than if the contract had never been made.
He has thus not been in fact injured. . . . The policy of the law, then, is not
merely to redress injuries but also to protect certain kinds of expectation by
making men live up to certain promises." (Italics added.)
2241 N. C. 538, 85 S. E. 2d 888 (1955).
2' 100 Fed. 224 (9th Cir. 1927). 2 Id. at 225.
2' Carver v. Britt, 241 N. C. 538, 540, 85 S. E. 2d 888, 889 (1955).
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fendant abruptly sold the property in question to a third party without
further discussing the matter with the plaintiff, although at all times
the plaintiff was available to the defendant. The defendant thereafter
remained evasive and uncommunicative after he had sold the property
to a third party, and never so much as acknowledged the efforts of the
plaintiff in attempting to secure a buyer for the plaintiff's property.
Another instance in which it appears that the court in construing the
legal effect of an alleged acceptance looked beyond the language to the
character of the actions of the parties is found in Knox v. McMurray.28
In that case business men used what the court decided was conditional
language in attempting to accept the offer of a "layman" who was ig-
norant of business methods, and who had expressed his ignorance to the
buyers in correspondence with them. In spite of the defendant's hesi-
tancy to enter into a binding agreement, the plaintiffs pressed him to
make an offer to which they replied with language which the court held
to be conditional. 29 Similar language had, in another case, been held to
constitute a valid acceptance. 30
In Skinner v. Stone,31 the court rejected the defendant's contention
that the plaintiff conditionally qualified his acceptance by requesting that
the defendant have acknowledged a deed and return it, draft attached, to
the plaintiff's bank. In that case, in rejecting the contention that the
plaintiff's acceptance was conditional, the court, in its opinion, empha-
sized the following facts:
"It appears from the testimony that appellant [defendant] made
no response to the letter of July 5th, but instead came down to
[the county where the land was located] and made inquiry about
its then market value without letting appellee [plaintiff-buyer]
know of his presence in the neighborhood. Finally, when pressed
to close the deal in accordance with the correspondence ... , ap-
pellant declined to do so upon the ground that the mind of the
parties had not met upon essential details. '32
From these statements of the court it may be inferred that in de-
ciding that the plaintiff's acceptance was unconditional the court was in-
fluenced by the fact that the defendant used the plaintiff's belief that a
2 159 Iowa 171, 140 N. W. 652 (1913).
20 Id. at 176, 140 N. W. at 653. 'We would like to have you send on the deed
and abstract to the Iowa State Bank of Waterloo, Iowa, and when they are ex-
amined, and found to be correct, your money will be turned over to you."
" Bushmeyer v. McGary, 112 Ark. 373, 376, 166 S. W. 168 (1911). In
that case the language was: "Please send your abstract to me at once, at the ad-
dress below. I will have same brought up to date and examined and proceed to
close up the matter with you."
"144 Ark. 353, 222 S. W. 360 (1920).
22 Id. at 356, 222 S. W. at 361.
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contract had been formed in order to gain an advantage for himself.
In summary, it would appear that although there can be no certain
test for determining how a court will construe the language of the
offeree which might seem to add contingencies to the original offer, an
analysis of these cases seems to indicate that in determining whether
a contract has been formed, the courts look beyond the language of the
parties to the nature of the actions of the parties. If it appears that one
of the parties knowingly allowed the other to rely on him as an expected
source of gain, and subsequently, either arbitrarily, or because he has
found a better bargain, cuts the other party off from the source of
gain, it is probable that the court will construe the language in favor
of the expectant party.
HARRIET D. HOLT.
Criminal Law-Search of Private Dwelling-Incident to Arrest
In Clifton v. United States," federal revenue agents went to the
defendant's home with an informant who told the person answering his
knock that he wished to buy whiskey. He was told to see Earl Padgett,
who lived down the road. The investigators and the informant returned
to the defendant's backyard with Padgett who entered the back door and
came out with a half-gallon of non tax-paid whiskey. The investigators
paid Padgett for the whiskey, identified themselves and arrested him.
Then one of the investigators searched the defendant's home and found
illicit whiskey. The investigators had neither a warrant for the arrest
of Padgett nor a search warrant for the defendant's house. The de-
fendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained by this search was
denied by the trial court, and he was convicted. The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, saying: "The search in this case was
reasonable, being incident to the arrest of Padgett. It is not necessary
that the owner be the party arrested in such a case." 2
This decision has extended the law of search incident to arrest far
beyond bounds heretofore established. The court not only sanctioned
the search of a private dwelling when the arrest took place outside the
dwelling, but also held such a search to be reasonably incident to a
lawful arrest where the party arrested was not the owner of the dwelling.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees to the people the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
'224 F. 2d 329 (4th Cir. 1955).2 Id. at 331. This case is of great importance to North Carolina because this
state adopted the federal rule that evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure
is, on proper objection, inadmissible in criminal proceedings. N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-27 (1951).
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